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The Western Media and the Portrayal of the 
Rwandan Genocide 
 
BY CHERICE JOYANN ESTES 
 
ABSTRACT: On December 9, 1948, the United Nations established 
its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.  Genocides, however, have continued to occur, affecting 
millions of people around the globe.  The 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths.  Global leaders 
were well aware of the atrocities, but failed to intervene.  At the 
same time, the Western media's reports on Rwanda tended to 
understate the magnitude of the crisis.  This paper explores the 
Western media's failure to accurately interpret and describe the 
Rwandan Genocide.  Recognizing the outside media’s role in 
mischaracterizations of the Rwanda situation is particularly useful 
when attempting to understand why western governments were 
ineffective in their response to the atrocity.  The media is self-
evidently a central tool in informing the public about issues, 
shaping public opinion, and promoting change within societies.  
Despite the objectivity that the media is expected to maintain, there 
is no denying that the media, whether intentionally or not, has 
occasionally reported on events and issues in ways that have 
misled or been misinterpreted by the public.  The western media's 
treatment of the Rwandan Genocide is a clear example of 
inaccurate and incomplete news coverage. 
 
 
In one hundred days, an estimated 800,000 Rwandan citizens lost 
their lives, while the United States and European powers failed to 
intervene.  Inaccurate reports in the Western media compounded 
the failure of outside governments to recognize the crisis as 
genocide.  Western publications circulated stories that 
characterized the tragedy in Rwanda in ways that minimized the 
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enormity of the event. For example the media would characterize 
the situation as "a tribal war" or merely the "continuation of a civil 
war." 
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the ways 
the Western media described the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and 
contrast those descriptions with the actual historical facts and 
circumstances of Rwandan politics and social relations.  Too often, 
African political events that have particular and distinguishable 
contexts and precedents are simply labeled as irrational tribalism, 
without any attention given to the causes of a particular 
occurrence.1  While journalists may attempt as best they can to be 
objective when relaying information, they, like anyone else, are the 
products of their training, their upbringing, their religious 
affiliation, and their political and social views. And, in the case of 
the Western media and Africa, the question of perspective is often 
exacerbated by the relative ignorance of Western media about the 
countries in Africa that they are asked to write about.  Anne 
Chaon, a journalist who spent time in Rwanda during the genocide, 
explains that: 
 
Most journalists are not experts in genocide.  Many 
of them - myself included - arrived in Rwanda with 
very little knowledge of the country.  So, it was 
tempting, especially at the beginning, to speak of 
the civil war, and to link these massacres to 
previous massacres since 1959.  We failed to 
understand that the killing was something totally 
new, that this was not a continuity of what 
happened before.2  
 
                                                
1 Melissa Wall, “An Analysis of News Magazine Coverage of the Rwanda Crisis 
in the United States,” in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, edited by Allan 
Thompson and Kofi Annan, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 262. 
2 Anne Chaon, “Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?” in The 
Media and the Rwanda Genocide, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. 
Weiss, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 160-166. 
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Far too often, correspondents assigned to cover an event or issue 
involving Africa have not received the training necessary to “cover 
issues, activities, and crises in developing countries.”3 
The media's mischaracterization and erroneous reporting 
about the Rwandan genocide is apparent in examples from 
American, Canadian, and European periodicals, and from other 
sources that covered the incident while it was occurring.  Many of 
the misguided reports were due to a lack of historical knowledge 
about Rwanda.  Thus, the first section of this paper examines the 
historical foundation for the social divide between the Hutu and 
Tutsi in Rwanda, the two groups involved in the genocide.  The 
paper then examines the events leading up to the genocide.  The 
third section focuses on the genocide itself and what I term the 
Rwandan "hate media."  In the last section of the paper, I highlight 
the misrepresentations of the crisis by Western media and their 
political ramifications. 
 
Historical Background 
 
Rwanda’s population consists of three main groups: the Hutu 
(85%), the Tutsi (14%), and the Twa (1%).4  These three groups 
share the same religion, speak the same language, and, prior to 
colonization, lived peacefully with one another in the same 
community.  In many cases they intermarried.  Each group 
considered itself as belonging to a single, integrated society, 
despite various social differences. The shared community among 
the three groups was not unlike the shared communities of the 
West, where, for example, Catholics and Jews live and work 
together in the same city or suburb. 
Pre-colonial Rwandese society was organized around the 
mwami, or king as the central figure of authority.  The mwami was 
considered to be powerful, sacred, and divine.  Rituals were carried 
out in his honor and a special vocabulary known as "king’s 
                                                
3 John C. Hammock and Joel R. Charny, “Emergency Response as Mortality 
Play: The Media, the Relief Agencies, and the Need for Capacity Building," in 
From Massacres to Genocide (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1996), 125. 
4 Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal of 
Opinion 23 (1995): 12. 
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speech" was used to describe his daily activities.  Gerard Prunier, 
author of The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide notes that: 
 
The king was the father and the patriarch of his 
people, given to them by Imana (God).  He is the 
providence of Rwanda, the Messiah and the savior.  
When he exercises his authority, he is impeccable, 
infallible.  His decisions cannot be questioned.  The 
parents of a victim he has injustly struck bring him 
presents so that he does not resent them for having 
been forced to cause them affliction.  They still trust 
him, because his judgments are always just.  
Whatever happens, he remains Nyagasami, the only 
Lord, superb and magnificent.5 
 
There were three types of chiefs who were under the king:  the 
mutwale wa buttaka (chief of landholdings), who was responsible 
for agricultural production, land attribution, and taxation; the 
mutwale wa ingabo (chief of men), in charge of recruiting men for 
the king’s armies; and the mutwale wa inka (chief of pastures), 
who ruled over the grazing lands.6  The mutwale wa buttaka was 
normally Hutu as agriculture was their expertise, while most of the 
other chiefs were Tutsi.  The chiefs were responsible for minding 
the cattle, working the land, and maintaining their quarters.  They 
also set the form of payment for each household under their 
jurisdiction, which allowed people to make their own arrangements 
to fulfill their government demands.  This system became known 
as ubuhake and remained in existence until the European powers 
changed the taxation system.7 
Rwanda remained free from European colonization until 
May 4, 1894, when the first European, German Count Gustav 
Adolf von Goetzen, was received at court by King Rwabugiri. The 
King welcomed the Count, but was unaware that the European 
powers had already divided up the African continent at the Berlin 
Conference of 1885. The decision to give Rwanda to Germany was 
                                                
5 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 10. 
6 Prunier, 11-12. 
7 Prunier, 12. 
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an act of ignorance: Germans knew nothing about Rwanda. The 
Rwandan monarchy continued to exist while Germany deployed 
twenty-four military officers and six administrators to Rwanda. 
According to Linda Melvern, a British journalist and published 
author, “The German policy was to support the chiefs in such a 
manner that they would be convinced that their own salvation and 
that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the 
German.” 8  The Germans also supported expansion and helped the 
Tutsi monarchy subjugate the northern areas.  
 After World War I, control over Rwanda and Burundi was 
transferred from Germany to Belgium under a League of Nations 
mandate.  This covenant “was to herald a new phase of human 
evolution, to offer a framework for practical and effective co-
operation between nations for their common good.”9 The covenant 
stipulated that the “tutelage of the peoples in the colonies should 
be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, 
their experience, or their geographical position, could best, 
undertake this responsibility.”10  Rwanda and Burundi were 
categorized as countries lacking in self-determination.  Belgium 
agreed to assume administration, as well as to promote 
development, free speech, and freedom of religion.   
 The Germans had implemented a policy of indirect rule, 
which changed to one of direct rule under the Belgians.  Slowly, 
the Belgians progressed in changing the societal structures that had 
existed throughout Rwanda’s history.  In 1922, the king was forced 
to accept the assistance of Belgian representatives and one year 
later Belgium made it illegal for the king to have regional chiefs.  
Belgian colonialists dismantled the only structure that Rwandans 
had known.  In 1931, King Mwami Musinga, who opposed 
colonization, was removed from power by Belgian administrators 
and replaced by Mutara Rudahigwa, who later became known as 
“king of the whites.” 11 His values and practices were more 
“western,” and his conversion to Christianity in 1943 became part 
                                                
8  Melvern, Linda , A People Betrayed The Role of the West in Rwanda’s 
Genocide (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 7.  
9 Melvern, 9. 
10 Melvern, 9. 
11 Melvern, 10. 
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of the Belgian policy that made Christianity mandatory for anyone 
wishing to be part of the Tutsi elite.12 
 The Belgian government divided Rwanda into four 
chiefdoms and gave Belgian administrators the authority to control 
every aspect of Rwandan society.  They introduced currency and 
implemented an education system available only to the sons of 
chiefs.  They also created an African civil service that included 
only members of the Tutsi oligarchy. Despite the Tutsi being a 
decidedly small fraction of the total population – dwarfed in 
numbers by the Hutu—Belgium was intent on elevating the Tutsi 
over the Hutu based on physical characteristics.  In this way, the 
Belgians were cementing their unfavorable attitudes toward the 
Hutu.  Under the direction of the Belgian administration, Tutsi 
chiefs demanded forced labor from the Hutu in building roads.  
The Belgians insisted on cruel and inhumane beatings as a method 
of punishment and control.  As a result, hundreds of thousands of 
Hutu peasants fled to Uganda to become migrant workers and 
escape the mistreatment.13 
 
 
European Stereotypes and the Hamitic Myth   
 
Europeans in Rwanda had long noted physical differences within 
the Rwandan population and, beginning with the Belgians, they 
began to exploit those differences to create a social divide and 
implement policies based on racial discrimination.  John Hanning 
Speke, a well-known Nile explorer in the 1800s, linked Rwandan 
“monarchic institutions” to the arrival of conquering invaders from 
Ethiopia (whom he speculated to be ancestors of the Tutsi). Speke 
posited that Tutsis were of a Hamitic, non-African race, and thus 
“superior.”14  Other explorers, such as Sir Samuel Baker and 
Gaetuno Casati, accepted this formulation. 
 Missionaries, such as Father van den Burgt and John 
Roscoe, also believed the explorers’ theories; some, however, had 
different opinions.  Father Pages, for example, believed that the 
Tutsis were descendants of ancient Egyptians.  Father van den 
                                                
12 Melvern, 10. 
13 Melvern, 10. 
14 Prunier, 7. 
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Burgt claims, “We can see Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek 
profiles side by side with Semitic and even Jewish features, elegant 
golden-red beauties in the heart of Ruanda and Urundi.”15 
 Tutsi features were described as though they were 
European and not of the same group as the Hutu.  Prunier notes 
that some Europeans thought: 
 
The Bahima [a Tutsi clan] differ absolutely by the 
beauty of their features and their light colour from 
the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type.  Tall 
and well-proportioned, they have long thin noses, a 
wide brow and fine lips.  They say they came from 
the north.  Their intelligent and delicate appearance, 
their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any 
situation seem to indicate a semitic-origin.16 
 
These Hamitic or Semitic characteristics were purportedly the 
underlying reasons why the Tutsi emerged as the privileged group.  
These stereotypes not only demonstrate that the Europeans were 
ignorant of Rwandese history and populations, but that they in fact 
facilitated the spread of racial animosity and hatred among the 
different groups.  Based on the assumption that the Tutsi were 
ancient European descendants, the Belgian government decided 
that they were “fit to rule.”  The Hutu, by contrast, were deemed 
inferior.  They were described as having typical African features:  
“short and thick-set with a big head, jovial expression, a wide nose 
and enormous lips.”17 
In 1933, the Belgian administration put together a group of 
Belgian bureaucrats to conduct a census of the entire population.  
The purpose was to classify every Rwandan as belonging to one of 
the three groups: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.  They counted each 
Rwandan, measuring height, nose length, and eye shape.18  Using 
physical characteristics as a way to group people into categories 
was, in fact, a flawed methodology because many Rwandans were 
mixed due to intermarriage.  The Belgians' solution to that issue 
                                                
15 Prunier, 7. 
16 Prunier, 7. 
17 Prunier, 6. 
18 Melvern, 11. 
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was to classify persons who were mixed as Hutu.  Hutus who were 
wealthy and owned the required number of livestock were 
considered Tutsi.19   
The Belgians then issued to every Rwandan an 
identification card that indicated the group to which the person had 
been assigned.  The identification card policy is a primary example 
of how the Belgian government created and fostered a racially 
divided population based on physical appearance, a policy that 
contributed significantly to the country's progression down a path 
that led to genocide.  
 
 
Belgian Discriminatory Policies and Their Outcomes 
 
The favoritism displayed by the Belgian government to the Tutsi 
population was pervasive and resulted in the creation of an African 
civil service limited to Tutsi elites.  In 1952, the Belgians 
introduced electoral procedures for advisory councils at four 
different administrative levels, limiting voting privileges such that 
the minority Tutsi won all the seats.20 
 Because of these types of discrimination and repression, a 
sense of Hutu nationalism and racist ideologies began to surface in 
the northern region of Rwanda.  In 1957, a group of Hutu 
nationalists published a manifesto that called for majority rule.  
Belgian Catholic priests supported the Hutus in their mission to 
gain equality and abolish discrimination within the public service, 
and in 1957, the United Nations pressured Belgium to liberate the 
Hutu. 
 On July 24, 1959, Rwanda’s Tutsi King Mutara III 
Rudahigwa died while in the hospital.  The Tutsi elite were under 
the impression that he was killed by the Belgians and that the Hutu 
were also involved.21  This rumor sparked outrage among the Tutsi 
population, and on November 1, 1959, a Tutsi group called Union 
National Rwandaise (UNAR) attacked a Hutu leader, Dominique 
Mbonyumutwa, which placed Rwanda in violent turmoil.  The 
                                                
19 Melvern, 11. 
20 Melvern, 13. 
21 Melvern, 14. 
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Hutu started burning Tutsi homes and launching attacks on them.  
Many Tutsi fled Rwanda as a result of the violence.   
This upheaval was only the beginning of the repercussions 
from European interference and the Belgians' restructuring of 
Rwandan society.  The Belgian government placed Rwanda under 
military rule on November 11, 1959.  Under international pressure, 
they tried to rectify the situation by replacing some Tutsi chiefs 
with Hutu and announcing to Belgian administrators that the Hutu 
would now be “favored within the administration.”22  Tens of 
thousands of Tutsi were forced into exile in neighboring 
countries.23 
 Gregoire Kayibanda, founder of the extremist Hutu group 
Parmehutu, wanted to end Tutsi dominance forever. He organized 
rallies to overthrow the Tutsi monarchy, a goal he achieved in 
September 1961.  By February 1962, an estimated 135,000 Tutsi 
refugees were living in exile in the Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika, and one thousand people were entering Uganda each 
week.24 
 
 
Opposition Growth Across Borders 
 
Tutsi men displaced in refugee camps were recruited into secret 
militia groups, called Inyenzi, or cockroach, by the Hutu.  On 
November 14, 1963, the Belgian National Guard stopped an 
Inyenzi attempt to enter Rwanda to kill Hutu.25  On December 21, 
1963, two hundred armed Tutsi men left Burundi and succeeded in 
crossing over into Rwanda, heading toward the capital Kigali.  
They were defeated and Kayibanda reacted to the Tutsi infiltration 
with an organized campaign to kill Tutsi. 
 These killings in 1963 left journalists puzzled as to why an 
event like this would happen.  Lord Bertrand Russell, a Welsh 
historian and philosopher, spoke of the event on Vatican Radio, 
claiming that, “It was the most horrible and systematic 
extermination of a people since the Nazi’s extermination of the 
                                                
22 Melvern, 14. 
23 Melvern, 14. 
24 Melvern, 14. 
25 Melvern, 17. 
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Jews.26 These massacres organized by Kayibanda were propelled 
by Kigali Radio, which aired warnings that the Tutsi were coming 
back to “enslave” the Hutu, proclaimed that, “The Tutsi must be 
killed before they killed the Hutu.” 27  Hoes, machetes, clubs, and 
any other tools attackers could access were used to kill at least five 
thousand men, women, and children.  Some one hundred Tutsi 
women and children committed suicide by drowning themselves in 
the river to escape Hutu mobs at the Congo border.   
Some consider this specific event genocide, though 
Europeans working for aid agencies in Rwanda during this time 
described the killings as “savagery of the negro.”28  Unfortunately, 
this was not the last time that massive killings would take place; a 
far worse massacre – the most horrible mass destruction of human 
beings since the Jewish Holocaust of World War II – would occur 
thirty years later. 
 Various groups of Tutsi refugees prepared to return to their 
homeland in order to oppose Hutu nationalism.  One group was the 
Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association, later known as the 
Rwandan Alliance for National Unity.29  This group operated in 
exile in Kenya from 1981 to 1986.  In 1987, the group changed its 
name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF consisted of 
a 26-member executive committee that included 11 Tutsi and 15 
Hutu who opposed then-President Habyarimana and wanted to end 
his regime.  A guerilla army known as the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army eventually grew from this organization.  They were well-
trained, disciplined and had considerable combat experience.30 
 
 
Civil War 1990-1993 
 
On October 1, 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Army forces attacked 
guards posted at the Rwandese border.  This surprise attack was 
the start of a civil war.  Former Major Paul Kagame, who is the 
current president of Rwanda, called this “the beginning of a 
                                                
26 Melvern, 17. 
27 Melvern, 17. 
28 Melvern, 18. 
29 Melvern, 26. 
30 Melvern, 27. 
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protracted popular war.”31  The goal was to put an end to the 
Habyarimana regime, return the Tutsi to their home country, and 
take control of the government.  Kagame worked with 
Habyarimana’s former accomplice, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, 
who was a Hutu living in exile.  After three years of fighting, the 
civil war ended with the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 
1993. 
 The civil war gained international attention.  President 
Habyarimana, a Hutu extremist, had come under scrutiny for the 
instability and violence that his rule generated throughout the 
region.  It took thirteen months of talks to get the Rwandan 
government and the RPF to agree to sign the accords, the only 
hope for an end to the civil war.32  The negotiations were overseen 
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), under the leadership 
of Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi.  Five African states 
were involved in the negotiations (Burundi, Zaire, Senegal, 
Uganda and Tanzania), along with four western countries: (France, 
Belgium, Germany, and the United States), which had observer 
status.  Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the European 
Union monitored the talks from their local embassies.33  
 Under the peace agreement, Rwandan presidential power 
was “reduced to no more than representing the Republic: the 
President could promulgate laws but had no authority to modify or 
veto them.”  Not only did he have no power to nominate civil 
servants, but he also could not suggest names for nominations.  
Any messages addressed to the nation had to be approved by the 
Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).34 
 President Habyarimana agreed to sign this accord only to 
maintain a good image in the eyes of foreign donors.35  He 
scrambled to get support from other African leaders to buy time 
and hold up democratization.  He traveled to Uganda to meet with 
President Museveni on August 31, 1993.  The meeting turned out 
to be unfavorable for President Habyarimana and left him 
                                                
31 Prunier, 96. 
32 Melvern, 52. 
33 Melvern, 52. 
34 Prunier, 193. 
35 Prunier, 195. 
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searching for outside supporters to delay the implementation of the 
Accords.36 
 Despite Habyarimana’s signing of the Arusha Accords in 
August 1993, he failed to implement the agreement; too much was 
at stake. The Hutu supremacists who had supported him realized 
that he was incapable of defending their interests. The Hutu 
extremist group Coalition Pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) 
decided to withdraw their support for Habyarimana and search for 
more radical representation and appease foreign governments who 
supported Habyarimana financially.  Despite criticism from Europe 
and other African states, and despite the eagerness of the RPF to 
integrate the forces and implement the accords, Habyarimana 
refused.   
 On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania and met with Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, 
Vice-President George Saitoti of Kenya, President Cyprien 
Ntaryamira of Burundi, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.  
The focus of the discussion was supposed to be on Burundi; 
Habyarimana’s refusal, however, to abide by the Arusha Accords 
was the topic of discussion.  Back home, on the other hand, Hutu 
extremists felt betrayed by Habyarimana’s signing of the Accords.  
Thus, whether or not he implemented the agreement, he was still in 
a difficult situation that he could not ignore. 
President Ntaryamira accompanied President Habyarimana 
in his aircraft on the way back to Kigali.  At around 8:30 in the 
evening on April 6, the aircraft was struck by two missiles.  
Ironically, it crashed into the garden of Habyarimana’s home and 
caught fire, killing everyone on board.  This incident sparked the 
beginning of the wave of killings that became widely 
acknowledged as the Rwandan Genocide. 
 
 
The Genocide of 1994: Rwandan Radio Hate Media 
 
The Hutu-controlled Radio-Television Libres des Milles Collines 
(RTLMC) was financed by Hutu extremists, which also included 
Habyarimana.  The purpose for this radio station had always been 
                                                
36 Melvern, 52-54. 
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to incite the Rwandan Hutu majority to genocide.37  The radio 
station started calling for the extermination of Tutsi as early as 
January 1994 in response to the Arusha Accords.  After 
Habyarimana’s death, the radio station announcers had a new 
rallying cry; they called for murder “to avenge the death of their 
president.”  On May 5, they declared that the country must be 
“cleansed” of Tutsis.38 
In order to achieve their goal, they helped recruit and 
organize the Interhamwe militias, whose purpose was to annihilate 
all Tutsi in Rwanda.  Radio announcers read the names and 
addresses of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were to be killed.  Their 
last-known locations were also broadcast, and listeners were told, 
“You have missed some of the enemies [in this or that place].  
Some are still alive.  You must go back and finish them off.”39  
The results proved to be one of the worst human disasters ever.  
Fergal Keane, a journalist and writer, asks his readers: 
 
Remember the figures, never ever forget them, in 
one hundred days up to one million people were 
hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to 
death.  Remember, carve this into your 
consciousness: one million.  This estimate equates 
to three hundred and thirty-three and a third 
murders an hour, or five and a half killings every 
minute.40 
 
The enormity of the bloodshed should have been recognized as 
genocide immediately, but, due to Rwanda’s remote geographic 
location and its lack of influence in the international arena, 
thousands of men, women, and children were slaughtered while 
world powers turned a blind eye.  An article in The Economist 
explained that, “The killing in Rwanda is too terrible to ignore. It 
amounts to genocide, a word that the United States will not 
                                                
37 Melvern, 71. 
38 Peter Ronayne, Never Again? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 157. 
39 Ronyane, 158. 
40 Ronyane, 159. 
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officially utter since to do so would make it harder to resist taking 
action.”41   
The Clinton Administration opposed using the term 
genocide to describe what was taking place in Rwanda at the time.  
Recognizing this as genocide would require the United States to 
intervene according to their adoption of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.  Nevertheless, United States government officials 
publicly acknowledged that “acts of genocide” may have been 
committed.42  David Rawson, former US Ambassador to Rwanda 
during this time, said during an interview that “As a responsible 
government, you don’t just go around hollering genocide.  You say 
that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be 
investigated.”43  While western powers danced around the issue, 
Hutu extremists carried out their successful agenda at an 
astonishing rate. 
 
 
Western Media Coverage of the Genocide 
 
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide officially started when President 
Habyarimana was killed.  The Hutu extremists who supported him 
blamed the Tutsi for his murder and wasted no time in trying to rid 
Rwanda of Tutsi.  Western media reported the violence as “a 
product of tribal factions.”44   The New York Times, for example, 
on April 9, 1994, headlined “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as 
Tribes Battle.”  The article understated events, citing “tribal 
bloodletting” as the cause for the high death toll and also for the 
evacuation of foreigners from Kigali, Rwanda’s capital.  The 
reporter, who clearly lacked an understanding of Rwanda’s long 
history of Hutu-Tutsi conflict, attributed the violence simply to the 
murder of President Habyarimana.  In fact, tension between Hutu 
and Tutsi had been building and worsening since the post-World 
War I entry of Belgium into Rwandan society and Belgium's 
                                                
41 “Who Will Save Rwanda,” The Economist, June 25, 1994, 13. 
42 Douglas Jehl,. “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide.’” 
New York Times, June10, 1994. 
43 Jehl. 
44 Niranjan Karnik, “Rwanda & the Media: Imagery, War & Refuge,” Review of 
African Political Economy 25 (December 1998): 614. 
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implementation of policies that included: inscribing “ethnic” 
identification on identity cards; relegating the vast majority of 
Hutu to onerous forms of forced labor; and favoring Tutsi in access 
to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sector.45 
In another article titled, “Africa Has Yet to Come to Terms 
with Its Tribal Divisions,” the author stated, “Rwanda is African 
tribalism in its extreme form.”46  A news article in the San 
Francisco Chronicle also incorrectly referenced the genocide as a 
“tribal vendetta.”47  On the same day, the New York Times also 
incorrectly referred to the genocide as a tribal war.48  In point of 
fact, the Hutu and Tutsi should not be referred to as different 
tribes.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a tribe is 
defined as “a group of persons forming a community and claiming 
descent from a common ancestor.”  The Hutu and Tutsi lived in the 
same community, spoke the same language, and shared the same 
religion.   
An article featured in the Boston Globe stated, “The 
Troubles in Rwanda and Burundi go back 500 years, to the time 
when the tall Tutsi came in from neighboring Ethiopia to establish 
dominance over the Hutu people.”49  Even though some of the 
physical features of Tutsi and Hutu differed, the two groups had 
been living together and co-mingling in Rwanda when the 
Europeans arrived.  Moreover, recall that under Belgian policy, the 
Hutu could be classified as Tutsi merely as a result of their wealth.  
The classification system that was created never accurately 
represented the population, thus to describe the genocide as a 
“tribal war or tribal conflict” is an incorrect description of what 
occurred.  The article below appeared in the New York Times one 
month after the genocide began and exemplifies the language used 
to describe this event. 
                                                
45 Catharine Newbury, “Background to Genocide: Rwanda,” A Journal of 
Opinion, 23 (1995): 12-17. 
46 Jonathan Power, “Africa Has Yet To Come To Terms With Its Tribal 
Divisions” The Gazette, final edition, B5, July 30, 1994. 
47 “Rwanda Struggle to Regain Balance/New Government Named, but Many 
More Massacred in Tribal Vendettas,” San Francisco Chronicle, final edition, 
April 9, 1994. 
48 “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle,” New York Times, late 
edition, April 9, 1994. 
49 “Ethnic War in Africa” Boston Globe, April 13, 1994,16. 
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Figure 1. Michael McMahon, “Tribal Fighting Flares Again Around the 
Rwandan Capital,” New York Times, late edition, 16 May 1994. 
 
 
Prolonged Civil War or Genocide? 
 
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist who lost forty-nine family 
members in the Holocaust, first used the word “genocide.”50  The 
term has been used to describe, “the systematic targeting of 
                                                
50 Samantha Power, “Raising the Cost of Genocide” in Fifty Years of Dissent, 
edited by Nicolaus Mills and Michael Walzer, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 295.  
Cherice Joyann Estes 
 
 
 
49 
national, ethnic, or religious groups.”51  The United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, to include, however, has defined the term, more 
broadly: 
 
Any of a number of acts committed with the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group: killing members of the 
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the 
group, and forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.52   
 
It is the totality of the intended extermination that marks genocide.  
 The intention and attempt of the Hutu to annihilate the 
entire Tutsi population is clearly an example of genocide, yet the 
media often portrayed this crisis as a civil war, implying that two 
opposing political viewpoints had taken up arms simply to gain 
control of the government.  Three months after the genocide began, 
USA Today headlined “Rwandan Rebels Call for Civil War Cease-
Fire.”53  The Gazette used the same mischaracterization in an 
article entitled, “Toll From Rwanda’s Civil War Nears 3 Million, 
UN Says.”54  The Washington Post published an editorial that 
identified the violence as “savage civil war.”55  The labeling of 
Africans as savages was started with the Europeans during the pre-
colonial era. Although colonialism is a thing of the past, western 
media continued to use these terms to describe the genocide.  Mark 
                                                
51 Power, 295. 
52 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (New York: United Nations, 1948).  
http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm (accessed May 31, 2010). 
53 Charmagne Helton, “Rwandan Rebels Call For Civil War Cease-Fire” USA 
Today, July 6, 1994, final ed., 1A. 
54 “Toll From Rwanda’s Civil War Nears 3 Million, UN Says” The Gazette, May 
14, 1994. 
55 “The Best News Out of Rwanda,” editorial, Washington Post, July 15, 1994 
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Doyle, a British journalist, recalls a conversation that he had with a 
BBC presenter: 
 
There are two wars going on here.  There’s a 
shooting war and a genocide war.  The two are 
connected, but also distinct.  In the shooting war, 
there are two conventional armies at each other, and 
in the genocide war, one of those armies – the 
governments side with help from civilians – is 
involved in mass killings.56   
 
Rwanda had been involved in a civil war from 1990-1993. The 
actions and goals of the Hutu extremists in 1994, however – to 
exterminate all Tutsis – made the million deaths in 1994 genocide 
and not merely the continuation of a civil war.  Mahmood 
Mamdani, professor of anthropology and international affairs at 
Columbia University, wrote:  
 
But whereas these Hutu were murdered as 
individuals—butchered for their beliefs or their 
actions—the Tutsi were murdered because they 
were Tutsi.  This is why the killings of more than 
half a million Rwandan Tutsi between March and 
July of 1994 must be called genocide.57 
 
"War" and "genocide" are not simply two variations of the same 
behavior and the media's characterization of the 1994 events in 
Rwanda as "civil war" necessarily misled and misinformed 
Western audiences.  In the Western mind, war is an activity 
involving two or more opposing sets of organized combatants or 
warriors who might contest land, property, or political supremacy.  
War involves accepted rules of engagement, the taking and 
humane treatment of prisoners who are returned at the conclusion 
of hostilities, and perhaps most importantly, the idea that civilians 
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are off limits to the warriors. The loser in a war surrenders and is 
not exterminated. 
 Genocide, on the other hand, is directed at the civilians as it 
aims to exterminate rather than to imprison, to annihilate rather 
than to capture.  It is not land or political powers that those 
engaged in genocide seek; rather, it is the total elimination of the 
existence of the persons who are the objects of the genocide.  
Western audiences were deceived by a "war" characterization that 
distorted, and in the process minimized, what was actually 
occurring in Rwanda. 
 
 
The Genocide and its Representation of Africa 
 
Africa is often depicted to Westerners as a place of destruction, 
death, and deprivation. Westerners should not be led to believe 
such characteristics represent the entire continent.  Nonetheless, 
some journalists reported the genocide as if it took place in all of 
Africa rather than in one specific country.  The Salt Lake Tribune 
published an article titled, “Map of Africa Shifts As More Wars 
Break Out African Map Runs Red; Wars Erupt Among 
Incompatibles.”58  The same newspaper also issued another article 
one day later headlined, “Foreigners Flee As Blood Flows in 
Rwanda Stench of Death Everywhere As Rebels Advance; U.S. 
Sends Troops to Burundi Americans Flee For Their Lives From 
Africa’s Land of Death.” 59  These headlines give the impression 
that the entire African continent was affected by the genocide and 
not just the country where it was taking place.  The cartoon image 
below was featured in the Christian Science Monitor when the 
Rwandan Genocide first started.  Garth Myers, Thomas Klak and 
Timothy Koehl argue that this image highlights the exaggerated 
misconceptions that all of Africa is experiencing the same crises.60  
                                                
58 “Map of Africa Shifts As More Wars Break Out African Map Runs Red; Wars 
Erupt Among Incompatibles,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 9, 1994. 
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A mother and her child are seen emerging from the continent 
without any specific geographic context as to where the genocide 
was actually occurring.  These types of depictions send a clear 
message about the way Western media views Africa, especially in 
a time of crisis. 
 
Figure 2: Image reprinted from Christian Science Monitor61 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Rwandan Genocide represents both an international and media 
failure.  As acts of genocide were perpetrated, Western powers 
ignored what was happening and the Western media continued to 
report the situation inaccurately and without any context.  The role 
of Belgian colonialism had created divisions within Rwandan 
society that segregated persons who were not members of separate 
tribes, but people who had lived and worked together for centuries 
before the Europeans arrived. 
The media, however, overlooked and over-simplified the 
origins of the genocide, and in so doing, misled Western 
audiences.  California State University Fullerton professor Ronald 
Pahl states, “What is neglected or ignored in the reporting on 
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Africa are the issues that have caused these problems for the 
African nations.”62  As long as Western media continue to portray 
the continent in this manner, the rest of the world will never be 
able to understand accurately the underlying reality of Africa and 
its issues. 
 
                                                
62 Ronald H. Pahl, “The Image of Africa in Our Classrooms” Social Studies, 86, 
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